The Origins of International Counterterrorism

Switzerland at the Forefront of Crisis Negotiations, Multilateral Diplomacy, and Intelligence Cooperation (1969–1977)

By

Aviva Guttmann



BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Contents

Acknowledgements IX Abbreviations XI

Introduction 1

From Bystander to Shaper of European Counterterrorism Cooperation 1 Method and Sources 6 Defining "Terrorism" 13 International Terrorism and the Global Cold War 16 State Security and the Culture of the Cold War in Switzerland 20

PART 1

Compliance, Coordination, and Censorship: Switzerland's Response to Palestinian and Brazilian Terrorism

 Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism: The 1969 Kloten Airport Attack and the 1970 Skyjack Sunday 27 Meticulously Prepared Crisis Mismanagement 36 Swiss Policymakers' Role during the Crisis Management 43 Summary of Swiss Reactions to Palestinian Terrorism 54
Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism: The Abduction of Ambassador Bucher (1970-71) 57

After Zarqa, Now Rio 61 First Round in the "War of the Nerves"—Unmaking of Swiss Policy 66 Second Round in the "War of the Nerves"—Limited Options 71 The Protracted Last Phase of the Crisis 74 Controlling the Kidnapping's Media Coverage 78 The Swiss Authorities' Threat Evaluation after the "Bucher Crisis" 87 Summary of Swiss Reactions to Brazilian Terrorism 91

Conclusions of Part 1: A Comparison of Crisis Management 95

PART 2 At the Forefront through the Backdoor: Switzerland's Counterterrorism Diplomacy	
	The Working Group on Terrorism and its Context 103 The WGT: The Start of Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking 107
-	iss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the ICAO: "An Elegant Way of ing Nothing" 111 Preparations for Rome: Constructive Obstruction 114 The Limit of Enhancing Aviation Security Laws 117
	iss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the UN: A Fastidiously anced Position 121 Drafting of the Swiss Position at the UN 128 The Swiss Position at the UN 129 UN Counterterrorism Efforts Deadlocked 132
	iss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE: Experts "Making" reign Policy 135 The "Non-Beginning" of the Convention 138 The ECCP Accelerates the Process 141 New Terrorist Attacks, Renewed Counterterrorism Efforts 144 The Police against the Rest: Inner Swiss Negotiations 147 Revision, Fast-Track, and Finalisation of the ECST 150 France against the Rest: The CoE Negotiations 155 French Decision-Making: Worrying About the Third World 157 Reinsertion of the Political Offence Clause 161 ECST: Success or Dead Letter? 167 The WGT: An Overview 170
	nclusions of Part 2: Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking in Iltilateral Fora 173

PART 3

In Defiance of Neutrality: Switzerland's Secret Counterterrorism Cooperation

The Club de Berne 183

6 A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance: Intelligence-Sharing within the Club de Berne (1971–1972) 193

Suspect Profiling: The Conspicuous Traveller 194 Political Activists as Terrorist Suspects 197 Tracing Terrorist Organisations 200 Terrorist Innovations in Weaponry and Tactics 207 Perpetrated Terrorist Attacks and the Lessons Learnt 210 Threat Assessments and Concrete Warnings 219 Summary of One Year of *Kilowatt* Cooperation 224

Conclusions of Part 3: A Glimpse into the *Club de Berne* in the 1980s 228

Conclusions 230

Crisis Management Shaping Swiss Counterterrorism Policy 230 Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking in the 1970s 236 Swiss Counterterrorism Intelligence Cooperation 239 **Research Avenues and Reflections** 241 How and Why Countries Cooperated 242 No Democratic Oversight 244 Politics of the Latest Outrage 246 Swiss Neutrality and Relations with the Third World 247 Further Research in Terrorism Studies 248 Summary and Outlook 248

Bibliography 251

Appendixes 271

Appendix 1: PFLP Propaganda Material 271 Appendix 2: UN Resolution 3034, 18.12.1972 272 Appendix 3: European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 27.01.1977 274

Index 281